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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law-Double Jeopardy-Multiple Transgressions
from a Single Act
D, a twenty-three-year-old male, pleaded guilty in the juvenile
court to contributing to the delinquency of a thirteen-year-old girl,
was convicted and sentenced. In a subsequent trial, D was con-
victed of statutory rape upon the same facts over his objection of
former jeopardy. Held, affirmed. Conviction in a juvenile court
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor does not bar prosecu-
tion in the circuit court for statutory rape, although the evidence
necessary for conviction was substantially the same in both prosecu-
tions. Bennett v. State, 182 A.2d 815 (Md. 1962).
The principal case does not involve any particularly new de-
velopment in the law. The doctrine of former jeopardy arose in
sixteenth century England when the death penalty was meted out
for many minor offenses. It was a means by which the courts at-
tempted to restrain excessive use of severe punishments. Horack,
The Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MiNN. L.
REv. 805 (1937). This reason for the rule is now obsolete. A
better reason for the rule today is to prevent the state from harassing
an individual by prosecuting him again for the same offense. The
doctrine might also be considered the criminal counterpart to the
civil law's maxim of res judicata, where each person is entitled to
one day in court and only one. In West Virginia the defense of
double jeopardy is provided for in the State Constitution:
nor shall any person, in any criminal case, . . . be twice put in
jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offense." W. VA. CONST.
art. III § 5. Generally speaking, the doctrine forbids a second trial
as well as a second punishment for the same offense. State v.
Fredlund, 200 Minn. 44, 273 N.W. 353 (1937). For a collection
of cases on this principle, see Annot., 113 A.L.R. 222 (1938).
The principal case is an example of one of the three areas
where the doctrine of double jeopardy fails to bar multiple prosecu-
tions. These are, cases of multiple sovereignty of the defendant, cases
of a single act producing the same wrong against more than one
person, and cases of a single act producing more than one wrong
against a single person. An example of the first area would
be a violation of a city ordinance and a state statute in the same
act, or a violation of a state and federal statute in the same act.
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926). The second area in-
volves cases where in one criminal act, more than one person is
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wronged. Such as, one gun shot killing two persons, or the robbery
of more than one person at one time. Hoag v. New Jersey, 356
U.S. 464 (1958). The third area, in which the principal case falls,
involves one criminal act producing several wrongs against one per-
son. Examples of this would be aggravated assault and murder,
rape and incest, or statutory rape and contributing to the delin-
quency of a minor. State v. Watson, 99 W. Va. 34, 127 S.E. 637
(1925).
The two tests commonly applied to determine whether one
offense or more is committed are the "same evidence" test and the
"same transaction" test. The "same evidence" test is applied in a
majority of jurisdictions. Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy
and Res Judicata, 39 IowA L. REv. 317 (1954). Under this test
a conviction or acquittal upon one indictment is no bar to a sub-
sequent conviction and sentence upon another, unless the evidence
required to support a conviction upon one of them would have
been sufficient to warrant a conviction upon the other. Note, 24
MINN. L. REv. 522 (1940). Generally, the "same evidence" test
is construed in terms of whether the same evidence would support
a conviction in either case. Hoag v. New Jersey, supra.
The "same transaction" test is that there can only be one
prosecution for the consequences of a single criminal transaction.
Dowdy v. State, 158 Tenn. 364, 13 S.W.2d 794 (1929). The
Dowdy case in referring to a second punishment said that even if
it were conceded that two convictions and two punishments may
be had in any case upon separate counts, the practice was not
approved and certainly it must be clear that the offenses were wholly
separate and distinct. The "same transaction" test would bar a
subsequent prosecution, because even though there may be many
offenses which took place during the same transaction, only one
prosecution may take place for the whole transaction. This result
is apparently reached under the theory that there was only one
crime, so that the defendant could not be tried twice for the same
offense. The "same evidence" test attempts to pin point which
offense in the transaction has been tried, while the "same trans-
action" test treats the whole transaction as one crime. The "same
transaction" test would prevent a second prosecution when the
proof shows that the second offense charged concerns the same
transaction as the first, even though additional elements need to
be proved. Kirshheimer, The Act, The Offense and Double Jeopardy,
1962 ]
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58 YALE L. J. 513 (1949). If the "same transaction" test had
been applied to the principal case the defendant would not have
been tried the second time.
In West Virginia, there probably exists a comparable overlap
between the two offenses as in the principal case. Although there
are no cases directly in point, the West Virginia Court has stated
that an act or transaction may constitute two offenses which may
be separately charged and punished. State ex rel. Lovejoy v. Skeen,
138 W. Va. 901, 78 S.E.2d 456 (1953). In the Lovejoy case, the
defendant had been convicted, in a magistrate court, of the offense of
having copper wire in his possession without a bill of sale. On a sub-
sequent warrant issued by the same justice the defendant was charged
with stealing copper wire. The defendant was convicted of grand
larceny in the circuit court on this second charge. Both offenses are
described in the same provision of the West Virginia Code, W. VA.
CODE ch. 61, art. 3, § 49 (Michie 1961). The court held that they were
separate offenses, and since the defendant was charged in the
justice's court with the crime of having wire in his possession with-
out a bill of sale, he was not tried for the crime of grand larceny
of the wire. Following the theory of the court, it would seem that
the defendant could have been tried again under the general pro-
vision for grand larceny in W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 3, § 13 (Michie
1961).
A situation that probably also parallels the instant case in
West Virginia is the negligent homicide provision W. VA. CODE ch.
17C, art. 5, § 1 (Michie 1961) and common law manslaughter
as provided in W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 2, § 5 (Michie 1961).
Cases of this type have, in the past, been prosecuted under the
common law manslaughter provision. State v. Lough, 143 W. Va.
838, 103 S.E.2d 538 (1958); State v. Lawson, 138 W. Va. 136,
36 S.E.2d 26 (1945). Although it is an open question in this
state, there seems to be nothing to prevent a prosecutor from trying
a defendant under the common law provision for manslaughter
and, failing to convict him, proceed again on the same facts under
the statutory provision of negligent homicide. It may be construed
that there are two separate offenses, one a statutory offense and
the other a common law offense. If this be the case, it would
appear that a prosecutor could so phrase his indictment as to create
two separate offenses out of the one act. An indictment which
charges a statutory offense is sufficient if it substantially follows the
[ Vol. 65
3
Curry: Criminal Law--Double Jeopardy--Multiple Transgressions from a Sin
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1962
CASE COMMENTS
language of the statute and fully and completely informs the de-
fendant of the character and causes of the particular offense charged.
The provision of our constitution which forbids that any person
shall be twice put in jeopardy, applies only to the same offense.
It has no application to another or different offense. State v. Taylor,
130 W. Va. 74, 42 S.E.2d 549 (1947). Thus the question presents
itself as to whether the statutory offense of negligent homicide is
the same offense as common law manslaughter. The court followed
State v. Taylor supra, in saying that the State Constitutional pro-
vision denying the State the right to twice place in jeopardy a de-
fendant has no application where the offense for which a defendant
is being tried is a different offense than the one involved in a
former prosecution. State v. Pietranton, 140 W. Va. 444, 84 S.E.2d
774 (1954).
For the doctrine of double jeopardy to operate properly, there
must be a balance drawn between the rights of an individual, in the
number of times he may be brought to trial for one act, and the
authority of the State to prosecute separate criminal offenses that
are committed in one act. It would seem that there is little the
courts can do to avoid these overlaps in the law. If they are to be
corrected it is up to the legislature to do it.
Earl Moss Curry, Jr.
Domestic Relations-The Effect of a Bigamous Marriage in a
Workmen's Compensation Proceeding
P married M, who at the time of their wedding was already
legally married. Under Kentucky laws this ceremony, between P
and M, was void. P was awarded benefits as a dependent widow
in a workmen's compensation proceeding. Held, a marriage con-
tracted in Kentucky, which is made void by the laws of that state,
cannot form the basis of a claim for compensation by one claiming
to be the widow of the deceased workman by reason of such mar-
riage. Meade v. State Compensation Comn'r, 125 S.E.2d 771 (W.
Va. 1962).
The instant case itself poses no particular difficulty, for it is
well established that a marriage which is void under the laws of
the state in which it is contracted or celebrated is considered void
everywhere. Spradlin v. State Compensation Comm'r, 145 W. Va.
19621
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